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A specific performance by the receiver, would be a form of satisfaction or payment which he cannot be required to make. As well
might he be decreed to satisfy the appellant's demand by money, as
by the service sought to be enforced. Both belong to the lienholders, and neither can thus be diverted :" EXpress Co.v. Railroad

Co., 99 U. S. 191; and see Commonwealth v. Franklin Ins. Co.,
115 Mass. 278. In any case, where judgment is rendered against
a receiver, it must be so entered as to be enforceable only against
the funds which are or ought to be in his hands: Commonwealthv.
Bunk, 26 Penn. St. 235.
As to the responsibility of the receiver in respect to his own conduct, he is governed by the same general rules which apply to most
classes of trustees. Thus it is 'his duty to keep the trust fund
entirely separate and distinct from his own money; and if he deposits
it in a bank in his own name, or loans it out, even temporarily, or
mixes it with his own funds and uses ihem together, or employs the
trust fund in trade, it is a breach of trust, and be will be chargeable with interest: Utica .ns. Co. v. Zynch, 11 Paige Ch. 520.
And if he wilfully and corruptly exceeds the powers conferred upon
him by the court, he is liable for the actual damage sustained by
reason of such misconduct: Stanton v. Alabama, &c., Rd., 2 Woods
506. And where one of two receivers misappropriates the funds,
and the other is grossly negligent, giving no attention to the dutis
of the trust, they will be jointly liable for the balance found due,
and will be chargeable with interest: Commonwealth v. Ins. Co., 14
Allen 344.
H. CAMPBELL BLACK.
Williamsport, Pa.
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The rule of law that a person who has been injured by a felony i, not allowed to
bring an action upon it for damages until he has instituted criminal proceedings, only
applies between parties injured and injuring, and not where the plaintiff has been
indirectly injured in the loss of his servant or daughter's services.

THIS was an action for loss of service by seduction.
The statement of claim alleged, in the 1st paragraph, that the
defendant had seduced the plaintiff's daughter and servant, and in
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the 2d paragraph, that the defendant had administered noxious
drugs to the plaintiff's said daughter for the purpose of procuring
abortion, whereby she has been made ill and incapacitated for
service.
The defendant took out a summons before Master FRANCIS, to
strike out paragraph 2, on the ground that it disclosed a felony for
which there had been no prosecution, and that, therefore, no cause
of action arose upon it. The Master struck out the paragraph, and
the plaintiff appealed to STEPHEN, J., in chambers, who referred
the question to the Divisional Court.
ff. Terrell, for the plaintiff.
A defendant cannot demur to a statement of claim on the ground
that it shows the cause of action to amount to a felony: Boope v.
.D'Avigdor, 20 Q. B. D. 412. Nor can the objection be taken by
plea: Osbornv. Gillett,L. R., 8 Ex. 88. The objection, if it is maintainable, can only be taken by the attorney-general. It is difficult
to trace the origin of the doctrine that a 6ivil right is merged in a
felony. The whole question was fully discussed in the case of Tells
v. Abrahams, L. R., 7 Q. B. 554. That was a case of trover and
trespass for a brooch, and it was there held that the judge was bound
to try the issues on the record, and that he was right in not having
nonsuited the plaintiff. BLACKBURN, J., in his judgment, refers
to the case of .tarkham v. Cobb, Sir W. Jones 147, as the origin
of all the dicta in the books upon the subject. This case is distinguishable from Wellock v. Constantine,2 H. & C. 146. In that
case the action was brought by a woman for an assault amounting
to a rape, and it was held to be not maintainable until after the defendant was prosecuted, because it was her duty to prosecute, and
because, if the plaintiff had consented, she could not maintain the
action for assault at all. In the case of Ex parte Ball, ln re Shepard, 10 Ch. D. 667; BRAMWELL, L. J., throws considerable doubt
upon the value of that case as an authority.
L. . -Pike, for the defendant.
A general duty is cast upon the plaintiff in this case to prosecute:
Osborn v. Gillett, Ord. 18, R. 1, is discretionary, and the court will
not interfere with the discretion of the Master when properly
exercised.
HUDDLESTON, B.-The Master in this case, has struck out the 2d
paragraph of the statement of claim, and my brother STEPHEN has
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referred the matter to us. The statement of claim was made by a
mother alleging that the defendant had seduced her daughter. In
the 2d paragraph it was stated that the defendant had further injured
her daughter by administering drugs to her for the purpose of procuring abortion. It was said that the Master was right, because
paragraph 2 disclosed a felony which could not be actionable until
prosecuted. Mr. Terrell says the objection cannot be taken by
demurrer nor by plea: Roope v. D'Avigdor. However, it seems clear
from the case of Wells v. Abraham, that there may be a power to
strike it out, and there is strong authority to show that a party
injured cannot maintain an action against the party injuring him:
Wellock v. .onstantine. In that case WILLES, J., nonsuited the
plaintiff, on the ground that she was the party injured. This was
noticed in the case of Ex parte Ball,In re Shepard,although some
doubt was suggested whether Wellock v. Constantine was an authority; at all events, BRAMWELL and BAGGALAY, L.JJ., decided in
favor of the plaintiff, on the ground that the duty to prosecute, if
any, was not in him; therefore, when a person who is himself or
herself injured, takes civil proceedings for the injury, no action will
lie until there has been a prosecution in a criminal court. This
rule does not apply when the party suing is not the party injured.
A master or father who sues for loss of service, can maintain the
action even if a felony is committed. In the case of Osborn v. Gillett, it was held that the master could not maintain an action for
the loss of his daughter and servant, who had been immediately
killed ; but the 4th plea, that the act amounted to a felony, and that
the person committing it had not been prosecuted, was held bad.
The argument of Graham in that case quoted White v. Spettigue,
13 M. & W. 603, as establishing that the rule as to a right of action
being suspended by felony, was not applicable except between the
party injured and the criminal: White v. Settigue is in point. In
this state of things we are bound by Osborne v. Gillett, and the
Master was wrong in striking out the 2d paragraph. It would be a
scandalous failure if the defendant could not be made amenable to
damages in such a case. The appeal must be allowed with costs.
am of the same opinion, and the authorities leave
no room for doubt. A person injured cannot bring an action for a
cause which amounts to a felony until he has prosecuted the felon.
Such a claim is not demurrable, nor can it be objected to by plea
WILLES, J.-I

APILEBY v. FRANKLIN.

because, if either of these were allowed, it would extinguish the
cause of action. Whether the cause could be suspended or withdrawn until the condition was fulfilled or not, is another matter,
but no better course could, in my opinion, be adopted than striking
out that which is wrongly put in. This, however, could only be
done against a person who is-under an obligation to prosecute, and
that is not the case here: Osborne v. Crillett, is strictly in point.
The English rule that a party directly
injured by an act amounting to a felony
in the defendant, could not maintain a
civil action for damages merely, was
supposed to rest on several grounds. One
was that by the felony all the defendant's lands and goods were forfeited to
the crown, and so it was useless for the
plaintiff to sue, since a judgment could
bring him no satisfaction. Another was,
the action was said to be merged in the
felony, in the same manner as a note is
merged in ajudgment upon it. But probably the true ground was, not that the
civil remedy was merged in the felony,
and so forever gone, but that from principles of public policy, the courts would
not sustain private actions in such cases
until the party injured bad done all in
his power to bring the offender to public
justice ; it being at that time, as is well
known, no person's official duty to prosecute for crime, and some stimulus was
necessary to induce the injured party to
carry on a criminal prosecution in order
to clear the way for his private redress :
see Crosby v. Leng, 12 East 413. If
therefore, he had discharged that duty,
and the guilty party had been convicted
of the felony, the civil action could go
on : Markham v. Cobb, Noy 82 ; Dawkes
v. Coveneigh, Style 346 ; Gra.flon Bank
v. Flanders, 4 N. H. 243. And this
was so, even though the accused had been
acquitted of the felony; the owner might
then bring his civil action, since his publie duty had been discharged, xinless
indeed he had aided in procuring the
acquittal : Crosby v. Leng, 12 East 409;
Smith v. Weaver, 1 Taylor 58; Morgan
v. Rhodes, 1 Stew. 70.

The hardship of first requiring a criminal prosecution before a private action
could be maintained, was never more
forcibly illustrated than in the late
English case of Wellock v. Constantine,
2 H. & C. 146 (1863), in which a young
woman was not allowed to maintain an
action for a felonious assault upon her,
by which her life was endangered, until
she had publicly prosecuted the offender
criminally; and as that could be done
only at her"own private expense, this was
a simple and gross denial of justice. A
much better rule had been adopted in this
country several years before in Koenig v.
Nott, 3 Hilton 323 (1859). This old
common-law rule has been sometimes
adopted in America in all its rigor:
Foster v. Tucker, 3 Greenl. 458 ; Boody
v. Keating, 4 Id. 164 ; Crowell v. Aferrick, 19 Me. 392; Belknap v. Milliken,
23 Id. 381.
This was subsequently
changed by statute in Mlaine, so far as it
related to stolen property, but apparently
no further.
The English rule was also adopted in
Alabama: McGrew v. Cato, Minor 8 ;
Middleton v. Holmes, 3 Port. 424 ; Blackburn v. Minter, 22 Ala. 613 ; Martin v.
Martin, 25 Id. 201 ; Nelson v. Bondurant, 26 Id. 341 ; Bell v. Toy, 35 Id.
184. So in Georgia: Adans v. Barrett,
5 Ga. 404; Neal v. Farmer, 9 Id. 555;
McBain v. Smith, 13 Id. 315. So in
New Brunswick: Pease v. XcAloon, I
Kerr 111.
Pennsylvania seems to have indirectly
recognised this doctrine; for notwithstanding its disapprobation in PiscataquaBank
v. Turnle], 1 Miles 312 (1836), in the
District Court of Philadelphia; yet in a
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subsequent case before the Supreme
Court, Hutchinson v. Bankof Wheeling,
41 Penn. St. 42 (1861), it was held, that
the right of action for articles stolen in
1850, was suspended from March 1852
to September 1852, while a criminal
prosecution was pending against the
thief; so that a civil action commenced in
August 1858, more than six years after
the taking, was not barred by the statutes
of limitations. A directly contrary result
was reached in Hwk v. Minnick, 19
Ohio St. 462 (1869).
On the other hand, considering that in
this country there is no general forfeiture
of lands or goods, for the commission of
a felony (except treason) ; considering
that every state has an official public
prosecutor of crime ; considering that no
stimulus of that kind is now necessary;
the prevailing doctrine here is that
the English rule does not apply, and the
civil remedy may proceed, whether the
offender has or has not been publicly
prosecuted, or any steps taken by the
injured party to bring him to justice.
The earliest dissent in Massachusetts
from the common-law rule seems to have
been in the case of Boardinan v. Gore,
15 Mass. 331, decided in 1819, which
did not however call for a direct decision
on the point, since in that case the defendant made a note payable to one
Cushing, and then forged the name of
Cushing as endorser, and passed it to
the plaintiff, who discounted it, and he
was allowed to recover the amount thus
loaned to the defendant as money had
and received, notwithstanding the forgery. See also Ocean Ins. Co. v. Pelds,
2 Story 74.
But the question directly arose again
in Boston 6- Worcester Rd. Co. v. Dana,
I Gray 83 (1854), in which thesuit was
against the agent of the company, for
money which he had stolen from the
drawers of the ticket clerks in their depot
in Boston, and notwithstanding an
earlier nisi prits decision of SEWALL,
C. J., to the contrary, the English rule

was entirely repudiated in a very able
opinion by BIGELOW, J., too long to be
quoted here.
It was cited and approved in the subsequent case of Atwood v. _7sk, 101
Mass. 365 (1869), in which it was said
a wrongdoer was not entitled to any
special privilege, because his tort also
amounted to a crime.
Perhaps the earliest recorded disapprobation of the English rule, to be found
in our reports is in the case of Cross v.
Guthery, 2 Root 90 (1794), which mas
an action by a husband against a surgeon
for negligently causing his wife's death,
by malpractice, the court somewhat erroneously saying, " the rule is applicable
in England only to capital crimes." However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in a nisi prius case had some time before.
refused to apply the English rule to a
civil action for fraud in passing to the
plaintiff certain forged certificates : Patton v. Freeman, I Coxe 113 (1791).
In 1812, by a divided court of three
to two, the Constitutional Court of South
Carolina decided that a civil action by a
master for enticing away a negro slave
(made a capital felony by statute) could
be maintained, as the civil action could
not be merged in the felony, and the
question of a felony '"ought not to be
tried in such a collateral way :" Robinson v. Cgup, 1 Const. Rep. by Treadway
231 ; 3 Brev. 302. And this was followed in the Court of Appeals: Cannon
v. Burris, 1 Hill 372 (1833), whichwas
trespass for feloniously killing the plaintiff's cow. Missouri also disapproved of
the doctrine in Nash v. -Primm,1 Mo.
125 (1822) ; Mann v. Trabue, Id. 709
(1827).
One of the best considered cases on
this side of the question, is that of White
v. Fort, 3 Hawks 251 (1824), North
Carolina, which was a civil action for
burning the plainti's house and barn,
in which the defendant had been complained of before the grand jury and no
billfound. The real question was whe-
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ther a conviction or acquittal by a petit
jury was a condition precedent to the
maintenance of tile
civil remedy ; but the
doctrine of the case goes to the whole
extent of denying the existence of the
English rule in this country, under any
circumstances. Judge WAnE in 1825,.
declared no such rule obtained in this
country, and forcibly stated the reasons
why, in Plummet v. Webb, 1 Ware 71.
In Allison v. Bank, 6 Rand. 223
(1828), Judge GnEEN of the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, in a very elaborate
opinion, declared against the doctrine,
saying among other things, "There is
not a single adjudged case reported to
this day, in which a civil action founded
on a wrong amounting to a felony has
been adjudged not to lie." As this was
several years after Foster v. Tucker, 3
Greenl. 460 (1824), and Boodg v. Keating, 4 Id. 164 (1826), this remark of
Judge GREEN's was not strictly correct.
In 1833, the question arose in Pettingill v. Rideout, 6 N. H. 454; trespass
for taking the plaintiffs horse, which had
in fact been stolen, RICHARDSONe, C. J.,
said "How a civil remedy can at this
day be considered as merged in a felony
counsel has made no attempt to explain,
nor does it seem to us to admit of any
explanation. To call a suspension of the
civil remedy, until the criminal justice of
the state is satisfied, a merger is in our
opinion very little, if any, short of an
abuse of language." The same judge
had previously expressed the opinion
that at all events, the civil remedy could
be suspended only until after the trial of
the alleged offender: Grafton Bank v.
Flanders, 4 N. H. 239 (1827).
The
Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Ballew
v. Alexander, 6 Humph. 433 (1846)

citing and approving Boardman v- Gore,

15 Mass. 337, declined to sustain a plea
of felony as a defence for an aggravated
assault and battery upon the plaintiff.
In Mitchell v. Mims, 8 Tex. 6 (1852),
the Supreme Court were inclined to
think that the better opinion is that the
doctrine is not applicable in this country.
In Newell v. Cowan, 30 Miss. 492
(1855), it was declared that the rule,
together with the reason on which it
was founded, "has long since been exploded."
Loflon v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 106 (1861),
declared no such rule prevailed in the
"United States." And Michigan, in
1867, was of the same opinion : E att v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 189.
In Arkansas and perhaps elsewhere,
the English rule is expressly repealed by
statute: Brunson v. Martin, 17 Ark. 277.
The conclusions to which the foregoing
review leads us are, that in this country
with a few exceptions:
1st. A private injuryis not "merged"
in a felony, so that the right of recovery
is forever gone, even though the criminal has been convicted and punished.
2d. That it is not necessary that a
criminal trial should be had before a
civil suit can be commenced.
3d. That if the private action is first
commenced, it will not be suspended or
continued, until after the criminal has
been convicted.
4th. That consequently the Statute of
Limitations will not be suspended during
the pendency of a criminal prosecution.
5th. That in the few states where the
contrary doctrine has been more or less
recognised, it has never been extended
to misdemeanors, but is strictly confined
to felonies: 4 Ohio 376; 6 B. Monroe
38; 15 Geo. 349; 16 Id. 203.
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